LASALLE REVISITED: THE USE OF AGENCY
SUBPOENA POWERS IN PARALLEL
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Where a criminal charge appears imminent, or is pending against
a defendant who is the target of a civil investigation or suit pertaining
to the same matter, there is a possibility that the criminal defendant
will be prejudiced by the use of discovery obtained in the course of the
civil proceeding.' In certain circumstances, the courts have reacted
by staying the civil proceeding or discovery until completion of the
criminal suit. 2 Where an administrative summons has been issued,
the courts have at times refused enforcement. 3 While these remedies
may safeguard the defendant's interests, 4 it has been argued that
At the investigation stage, the primary danger is that a civil summons will be issued solely
to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437
U.S. 298, 308 (1978); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1971); Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). There is also a danger that the defendant's fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination will be violated. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1,
7-10 (1970); United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 200-01 (D.D.C. 1965).
Once an indictment is issued the danger becomes more acute. Enforcement of the summons
may expand criminal discovery, or force the defendant to reveal his defense in the criminal suit.
See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
100 S.Ct. 529 (1980); United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1974).
E.g., Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stay denied, but protective order to prevent discovery may be justified); Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (stay granted); Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14
F.R.D. 333, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (stay granted).
If the government demands a stay in a purely civil suit, the courts will readily grant it.
Panel Discussion of Practicing Law Institute, [1979] 522 SExc.REG. & L. REP,. (BNA) A-9 (Sept. 3,
1979). See, e.g., Cambell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963).
Judicial authority to grant a stay of discovery derives from FED. B. Civ. P. 26(c). The
federal rules "apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents
in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any
statute of the United States." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3). It should be noted, however, that
application of the rules is discretionary with the court. Id.
For a detailed discussion of remedies available in civil and criminal proceedings, see
Comment, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1284-94
(1967).
E.g., United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974). Typically, statutes provide
that agency summonses must be enforced through the district courts. J. GRuF, B. MEZINES & J.
STEs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 21.02, at 21-9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. GRUFF]. E.g., I.R.C.
§ 7402(b); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(c) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). See Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285, 286 (10th Cir.
1964). In the case of parallel investigations courts will almost always enforce summonses. Panel
Discussion of PracticingLaw Institute, [1979] 522 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Sept. 3, 1979)
(remarks of Arthur Mathews).
' See note 1 supra.
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government agencies should be free to investigate civil liability despite
criminal proceedings, and that to restrict this freedom is contrary to
the best interests of the nation. 5
This clash between competing interests has arisen most frequently with respect to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summonses."
The Supreme Court dealt with this conflict in United States v. LaSalle
National Bank,1 and concluded that enforcement of an IRS summons
is improper once a recommendation for criminal prosecution has been
made. In addition, the Court concluded that issuance of a summons
solely to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution constitutes bad
faith. The criminal recommendation issue is related to that of bad
faith in that in both instances information obtained through a civil
summons may improperly further a criminal prosecution. This comment examines whether the two-fold rule enounced in LaSalle pertaining to parallel civil and criminal proceedings 8 should be applied
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other administrative agencies.
THE IRS CONTEXT
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides the
agency with broad statutory authority' to summon records and witnesses in order to investigate civil tax liability. 10 This civil summons

5 See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970); Pickholz, Parallel Enforcement
Proceedings: Guidelines for the CorporateLawyer, 7 SEC. REc. L.J. 99, 116 (1979).
6 The IRS issues more summonses than any other agency. Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv.
1227, 1329 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Developments]. The number of IRS summonses should
continue to rise because the IRS's demand for documents is growing even greater. See Rout,
Auditors Say IRS Demand for Documents Is Poisoning Relations with Client Firms, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 15, 1981, at 25, col. 4.
The number of SEC summonses has also risen dramatically of late. Pickholz, supra note 5,
at 101.

437 U.S. 298 (1978).
8 "In its purest sense, the phrase 'parallel proceedings' conjures up ...

coexisting investigations and proceedings by the SEC (or other federal regulatory agencies) and the Department of
Justice." Pickholz, supra note 5, at 110.
" United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975) (holding John Doe summons valid).
The IRS need not even show probable cause when issuing a summons. Id. at 146; Ryan v. United
States, 379 U.S. 61, 62 (1964). Furthermore, the courts have liberally construed I.R.C. § 7602.
United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp. 607, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
10 I.R.C. § 7602.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized-
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power 1" is subject to few limitations.12 The IRS may also issue a
summons when investigating criminal violations of the Code as long
as there is also a valid civil purpose to the investigation. 13 The agency

(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer
or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons
and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
Id.
t The SEC is empowered to "subpoena" witnesses, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976), whereas the IRS is given the
power to "summon" witnesses. I.R.C. § 7602. Courts have treated the terms summons and
subpoena as synonymous. E.g., Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 356 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
'2 There are some limitations on this power, however. Courts have stated that I.R.C. § 7602
does not justify "fishing expeditions." E.g., Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
But see United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1973) (such "expeditions" will be
sanctioned if information sought is relevant). Once liability has been determined, and the tax
paid, the IRS no longer has authority to issue a summons. United States v. Tosie, 336 F. Supp.
1051, 1052 (E.D. Mo. 1971). Furthermore, the IRS must comply with the good faith standard
set forth in Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See note 32 infra. All summonses are also
subject to constitutional attack.
With respect to bank records, the Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (Supp. 11 1978),
does not really place any limitations on the IRS summons power. To obtain records the summons
must merely be relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, and the IRS must serve a
notice and copy of the summons upon the customer being investigated. Id. Cf. The Tax Reform
Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (party entitled to notice when third party recordkeeper is
summoned).
13 LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 308; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535 (1971). I.R.C. §
6653(b) provides for a 50% penalty in cases of underpayment due to fraud. I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207,
concerning fraudulent returns and statements, provides for criminal penalties. Therefore, an IRS
summons must have been intended to be used both for the investigation of criminal tax fraud and
for the calculation of the 50% civil penalty. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 308.
This analysis is bolstered by 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (1980), which states that the Intelligence Division of the IRS should encourage compliance with the internal revenue laws by "the
investigation of possible criminal violations of such laws and the recommendation (when warranted) of prosecution and/or assertion of the 50 percent ad valorem addition to the tax." Id. On
its face, I.R.C. § 7602 does not appear to forbid the issuance of summonses for solely criminal
proceedings. Nevertheless, the courts have construed the statute to preclude such activity. E.g.,
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) (dictum); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d
845, 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1966); Boren v.
Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1965). But cf. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (summons not invalid merely because issued solely for criminal purpose); United
States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822
(1978)(summons not invalid merely because issued solely for criminal purpose).
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4
has a special investigatory division which handles criminal matters.'
Once sufficient evidence is obtained,' 5 however, the IRS refers the
case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.' 6
The "criminal purpose defense" is simply a way of stating that
the defendant claims a summons was issued for the sole purpose of
furthering a criminal investigation. 7 Despite relatively clear statutory language' 8 and much case law,' 9 many defendants in early cases
appear to have misused the defense. They contended that a summons
was improper if issued in an investigation which could potentially
result in a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 20
Donaldson v. United States2' dispelled much of this confusion.
The main issue in Donaldson was whether a taxpayer had the right to

1"This division is known as the Intelligence Division, and it utilizes "special agents." Stroud,
The Criminal Prosecution Defense: A Defense to a Section 7602 Summons?, 4 AM. J. CrIM. L.
152, 158-59 (1975-76). The appearance of a special agent shifts the emphasis of the investigation
from civil to criminal. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976); United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977), revd, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). See Andrews,
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigationsunder Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage," 53 IowA L. REv. 1074, 1111 (1968).
11 Evidence collected by special agents may be used either in the civil or the criminal
proceeding. Stroud, supra note 14, at 161.
" "There is effectively a recommendation at each level upward in the Service's chain of
command regardless of the labels attached. The ultimate recommendation by the Service is
referral to the Department of Justice." United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1972). For a detailed discussion of the recommendation procedure, see Andrews, supra note
14, at 1082-85.
17 The criminal purpose defense has also been referred to as "the institutional bad faith
defense," "the criminal prosecution defense," and "the improper purpose defense." All these
terms "grasp the vital core of Donaldson." LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 305 (quoting United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).
"sSee note 13 supra.
"oE.g., United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1037 (1970); United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 928 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973
(1969); United States v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 1284, 1286 (6th Cir. 1969); Wild v.
United States, 362 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1966); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th
Cir. 1956). These cases all held that a summons issued for a criminal purpose is not invalid as
long as there is also a civil purpose.
20 These claims were based on dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
"[Tlhe witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate, ground. This would include, as
the circuits have held, the defense .. .that the material is sought for the improper purpose of
obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution ....."Id. Because of a citation to Boren v.
Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1965) (distinguishing United States v. O'Connor, 118 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953), where the taxpayer was under indictment), courts have interpreted
the Reisman dictum as applying "to the situation of a pending criminal charge or, at most, of an
investigation solely for criminal purpose[s]." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533
(1971).
21 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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intervene in the government's enforcement action. 22 Having resolved
23
that issue against the taxpayer, the Court went on to state in dictum
that "under Section 7602 an internal revenue summons may be issued
in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution." 2 4 Implicit in the Court's
holding was the notion that an IRS summons is not issued in bad faith
merely because there is the possibility that an investigation will result
in criminal recommendation.
Although Donaldson went far towards clarifying the proper
standard of review in IRS cases, it nevertheless left many questions
unresolved. The lower courts were not sure whether the good faith
requirement applied to the actual agent, or whether it applied to the

22 Id. at 527. See generally J. GruwF, supra note 3, § 21.02(2), at 21-22 to -26. The taxpayer
claimed a right of intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and also under Reisman v. Caplin,
375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964), wherein the court stated that "'thirdparties might intervene to protect
their interests." The Donaldson Court concluded that rule 24(a) only applied where *'there[was]
a significantly protectable interest," 400 U.S. at 531, and that application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to summons enforcement proceedings was discretionary. See FED. R. Civ. P.
81(a). Furthermore, under Reisman intervention was permissive and not applicable to the case
at bar. 400 U.S. at 529-30. The Court, exercising its discretion, held that the taxpayer could not
intervene. Id. at 531. Contra, United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 933 (7th Cir.
1969) (absolute right to intervene under Reisman); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312, 314
(3d Cir. 1966) (absolute right of intervention under Reisman).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 7609, partially overruled Donaldson's denial of
intervention. "Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is entitled to notice
of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding with
respect to the enforcement of such summons under section 7604." Id. § 7609(b)(2). A party is
entitled to notice when "any summons . . . is served on any person who is a third-party
recordkeeper." Id. § 7609(a)(1)(A).
23 Technically, this is dictum because once having resolved the issue of intervention, supra
note 22, there was no need to address the good faith issue. This created some confusion, and
many courts attempted to reconcile the "true holding" with the "dictum." E.g., United States v.
Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding it necessary to harmonize dictum with
holding by stating that government summons would not be issued in good faith if issued solely for
purpose of furthering criminal prosecution); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460
(6th Cir. 1973) (holding that proper standard according to Donaldson was whether summons
was issued for sole purpose of criminal prosecution, this being almost always the case where
criminal prosecution is pending). But cf. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir.
1975) (no reason to distinguish holding from dictum in Donaldson).
The best approach is to view the Donaldson "dictum" as the true holding. United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 308 (1977) (characterizing dictum in Donaldson as holding).
See United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that although
technically dictum, such dictum should not be lightly dismissed).
21 400 U.S. at 536. In prior cases, the courts had refused to enforce summonses issued after
indictment. E.g., United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953). Even after
Donaldson, the fact that the target of an investigation is under indictment is a crucial factor.
United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1974) (refused to enforce summons where
subject of summons was under indictment for violation of federal narcotic laws, even though IRS
had never recommended criminal prosecution).
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institution as a whole. 25 Also, it was unclear whether the critical
recommendation was that of the agent to his superiors, or that of the
IRS to the Justice Department.26 Moreover, Donaldson was chiefly
concerned with the criminal purpose defense and failed to explain
adequately why criminal recommendation was chosen as the cut-off
27
point for summons enforcement.
In LaSalle, the Court was once again confronted with the validity of a summons issued by a special agent2 prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Unlike Donaldson, which involved the
mere potential of a criminal recommendation, LaSalle focused on the
claim that the investigation was being conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution. 29 Extending
Donaldson, the Court set forth a two-fold test for determining the
validity of a summons. 30 First, the summons must have been issued
before a criminal recommendation. Second, the summons must have
been used in good faith.31 For a summons to have been issued in good
32
faith, it must meet the criteria articulated in United States v. Powell,

25 E.g., United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (agent must act in
good faith).
2 E.g., United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Cal. 1973) (holding that critical

recommendation was that of agent); United States v. Billingsley, 331 F. Supp.. 1091, 1092 (N.D.
Okla. 1971) (critical recommendation was that of agent to superior), rev'd, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209
(10th Cir. 1972) (crucial recommendation was that of IRS to Department of Justice).
27 With respect to the recommendation issue, the court merely stated that issuance of a
summons must have been prior to recommendation, 400 U.S. at 536, and seemed to assume that
at that point any investigation would have been improper.
The Court explained in great detail why the appearance of a special agent did not signify
that the investigation was being conducted solely for criminal purposes. 400 U.S. at 535. Accord,
United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 703 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Erdna, 422 F.2d 835,
836 (3d Cir. 1970). One commentator, however, has stated that the appearance of the special
agent signifies that the investigation is for purely criminal purposes. Andrews, supra note 14, at
1084.
2 The Court followed Donaldson in viewing the appearance of the special agent as insignificant, and found no need to even discuss the issue. 437 U.S. at 316. See note 27 supra.
29 437 U.S. at 307-08.
30 Id. at 318.
31 The dissent did not agree with this part of the test. Adopting the "bright line" test of
United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1978), Justice Stewart would
have found the summons invalid only if there had been a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 437 U.S. at 321 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He found no limitation in I.R.C. § 7602 to the
effect that a summons is invalid if issued solely for a criminal purpose. 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Stewart found that the good faith requirement referred only to the matters
mentioned in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964), see discussion at note 32 infra, and
not to the criminal purpose test. 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Accord, United States
v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585
F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that "bright line test" which it had adopted was not valid
after LaSalle).
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and must have been issued for a civil purpose.3 3 Furthermore,
the Court specified that what was required was "institutional good
faith" as opposed to the good faith of the individual agent, 34 and that
the critical recommendation was that of the IRS to the Department of
35
Justice.
The majority opinion in LaSalle was based largely upon a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.3 6 The Court found that the agency summons power should
have been proscribed once a criminal recommendation was made,
since at that point the civil and criminal aspects of the case began to
diverge-albeit never completely.3 7 Despite its recognition that the
IRS had statutory authority to issue a summons for a civil purpose
even after making a criminal referral,3 8 the majority was concerned
that criminal discovery would be broadened and the role of the grand
jury infringed upon were the agency to exercise that power.3 9 Moreover, the Court found that it was precisely because of the IRS statutory provisions that these interests would become jeopardized upon

It has been pointed out, however, that because the taxpayer's burden of proof is so heavy, it
is really as if the "bright line test" were in effect. Developments, supra note 6, at 1326. Before
recommendation by the agent to his superior, the summons is "virtually unassailable." United
States v. Censer (Genser I), 595 F.2d 146, 151 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979). After
recommendation to the agent's superiors, the taxpayer's burden is "heavy." LaSalle, 437 U.S. at
316. This burden may be eased by allowing the taxpayer basic discovery. See Comment, The
InstitutionalBad Faith Defense to the Enforcement of IRS Summonses, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 621,
639 (1980); note 145 infra.
32 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). Four requirements were set forth in Powell: (a) The summons
must be issued for a legitimate purpose; (b) The summons must seek information which is
relevant to the legitimate purpose; (c) The information sought must not already be in the
possession of the government; and (d) Proper administrative steps must be followed.
11 437 U.S. at 318.
3
The Court noted that there are several layers of review, and that in order for a recommendation to be made to the Department of Justice, officials at a minimum of two layers must
concur in the agent's conclusion. Id. at 315. The individual agent's motivation is not dispositive
since the criminal prosecution can be abandoned at any stage. Id.
15 Id. at 318.
31 Id. at 308-11. See note 13 supra.
31 437 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 312. However, one commentator has stated:
l8
The policy of the Service is to defer the civil investigation until the criminal investigation is completed in order to avoid the improper use of a summons when an
indictment has been issued. The deferment of the civil investigation continues into
the prosecution stage because a summons would not be enforceable when a criminal
case is pending, and the Service would have to rely on a search warrant.
Stroud, supra note 14, at 159. Clearly no statutory authority can -be found for the proposition
that the IRS lacks authority to issue a summons when a criminal case is pending, although it is
recognized that for all practical purposes authority isterminated. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 312.
Nonetheless, a summons may be unenforcable for constitutional reasons. See notes 102-03 infra.
39 437 U.S. at 312.
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recommendation to the Department of Justice. Once a recommendation was made, the IRS lost its authority to settle the case. This
authority passed to the Justice Department. 40 Under such a scheme
collaboration between the IRS and the Justice Department was to be
expected. 4 1 Thus, the Court concluded that "it was unrealistic to
attempt to build a partial information barrier between the civil and
criminal branches of the executive, 42 and adopted a prophylactic rule
prohibiting enforcement after a recommendation to the Justice Department.
While LaSalle can fairly be said to have resolved many major
questions with respect to parallel civil and criminal tax investigations, 43 it still was not clear whether the rule relating to criminal
recommendation was "based on principles generally applicable to
parallel civil and criminal proceedings, or on limitations unique to the
IRS." 44 Another issue which remained lurking was to what extent
the criminal purpose defense was viable with respect to other agency
summonses.
THE SEC CONTEXT
The applicability of the LaSalle rule to SEC subpoenas was
recently addressed in SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 45 The contro-

40

I.R.C. § 7122
(a) AUTHORIZATION. The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case
arising under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of
Justice for prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may
compromise any such case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.

Id.
4
437 U.S. at 312. "Interagency cooperation on the calculation of civil liability is to be
expected." Id. See Aviation Corp. v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 49], 496 (Ct. Cl. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 771 (1943) (IRS official participated in negotiations for compromise rettlement).
41 437 U.S. at 312.
43 One point which the Court did not make absolutely clear is whether the IRS must have a
civil purpose for the investigation as a whole when the summons is issued, or whether each
individual summons must be issued for a proper civil purpose. See United States v. Genser
(Genser 11), 595 F.2d 146, 151 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979) (purpose of each
summons examined); United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1979)
(purpose of each summons examined).
For an excellent discussion of this point, see Comment, supra note 31, at 626-28, which
points out that LaSalle furnishes more support for the general civil purpose test since the opinion
never refers to the institutional purpose behind the particular summons, and Note, 25 Vill. L.
Rev. 934 (1980).
4 SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1366, 1378 n.25 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied.
100 S.Ct. 529 (1980).
Is 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 529 (1980).
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versy in Dresser arose over certain questionable foreign payments. 46
Pursuant to the SEC voluntary disclosure program, 47 Dresser had filed
a Form 8-K on three separate occasions. 4 The agency demanded
that Dresser release the documents which formed the basis of the
report. Dresser refused to relinquish them for fear that the documents
might be publicly disclosed, thereby endangering the lives of employees abroad. 4 The SEC staff then recommended that a formal
investigation be commenced. 50 Meanwhile, the Justice Department
46 Id. at 1372. In 1976 the SEC commenced an intensive investigation of questionable
payments both domestic and foreign. Tigue & Abrams, A Current Analysis and Appraisal of
IRS's Sensitive Payments Investigation, 52 J. TAX. 160, 160 (1980). The SEC was soon joined by
the IRS which began investigating the tax impact of "corporate slush funds." Id. The role of the
IRS in such investigations has waned, however, since passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, P.L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), under which the SEC is charged with investigating
corporate bribery of foreign officials and associated inaccurate or misleading financial recordkeeping.. These violations have been made criminal under the Act. Tigue & Abrams, supra, at
163.
11 628 F.2d at 1371. This program was initiated in order to encourage corporations to
conduct their own investigations and to make disclosures. A corporation which participated in
the program would be much less likely to be subject to an SEC enforcement action. Id.
The IRS resorted to an inquisitorial method. It sent a questionaire to corporations nationwide (the "eleven questions") demanding that they make disclosures. Tigue & Abrams, supra
note 46, at 160. Recently the questions to be put to corporations in dubious cases were reduced to
five. They concern "payments, gifts, and loans of money, services, and property for business
concessions or political purposes." Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 5. IRS agents were
instructed to look for leads in internal audit papers, foreign cables, and SEC reports. They were
also authorized to interview persons such as dismissed employees, outside auditors, and corporate airplane pilots. Suspicious signs include corporations that serve governments, have histories
of payoffs, and frequent executive trips to countries with bank secrecy laws. Id.

18 628 F.2d at 1372. This was just one of several steps necessary to comply with the voluntary
disclosure plan. The main steps were: (1) A thorough investigation of the corporation by an
independent corporate committee; (2) Disclosure of the results to the board of directors; (3)
Disclosure of the results to the SEC on Form 8-K; and (4) The issuance of a policy statement
prohibiting improper practices in the future. Id. at 1371.
19 Id. at 1372. Public disclosure might occur pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), offered Dresser no protection
since it was a corporation. The Act only protects "individuals" who are defined as "citizen[s] of
the United States or . . . alien[s] lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id. § 552a(a)(2).
The government has explicitly stated that business associations are not protected. Office of
Management and Budget, Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. No. 132, 28951 (July 9, 1975).
See OKC v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 550 (1978).
50 628 F.2d at 1372.
Where . . . it appears that there may be violation of the acts administered by
the Commission or the rules or regulations thereunder, a preliminary investigation is
generally made. In such preliminary investigation no process is issued or testimony
compelled. When it appears from information obtained either with or without a
preliminary investigation that there is a likelihood that a violation has been or is
about to be committed and that the issuance of process may be necessary, the matter
is reported to the Commission, which may then order a formal investigation or
examination if it is deemed necessary.
Informal and Other Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1980).
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task force on illegal transnational payments 5' requested access to SEC
files on hundreds of corporations. These files were transferred, including a file on Dresser containing the Forms 8-K. The Justice Department subsequently presented the Dresser case to a District of Columbia Grand Jury.
Dresser filed suit claiming that the transfer of its file to the
Department of Justice was the equivalent of a recommendation for
criminal prosecution,5 2 and that LaSalle prohibited post-referral use
of subpoenas.5 3 The SEC, however, distinguished LaSalle in several
respects.5
It denied that the transfer of the Dresser file was the
equivalent of a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the SEC argued that even if LaSalle applied, the prophylactic
rule should come into effect only upon a formal criminal recommendation.5 5 The agency also claimed that contrary to section 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code, there was a clear legislative intent to
51628 F.2d at 1372. This task force was organized in May 1976, and utilized two SEC
attorneys to investigate criminal violations of the security laws as well as other United States
laws. Brief of Repondent-Appellant at 5, SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (panel opinion).
52 628 F.2d at 1373.
The SEC derives authority to transmit information to the Justice
Department from the Securities Act of 1933, U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). Unlike IRS procedure, there are two types of SEC
criminal recommendation procedures: informal and formal. The informal method is utilized
primarily when a United States Attorney requests files in a particular case. The request is
reviewed by the Director of the Division of Enforcement and the General Counsel. It is then
referred to the Commission usually with a recommendation that the files be transferred. When
the file is eventually transferred, the SEC makes no recommendation as to whether any action
should be taken by the Justice Department. SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, United States v. Fields,
592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979) (included in Appendix to Reply Brief of Respondent-Appellant at
A7-A9, SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion)).
In a formal criminal recommendation, the Commission staff prepares a written report. This
report contains "a detailed statement of the information developed during the course of the
Commission's investigation keyed to the available evidence, an analysis of applicable law, an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and recommendations as to who should be
prosecuted and for what offenses." Id. at A-8. The Commission then decides whether to refer the
report along with any evidence and its recommendations to the Department of Justice. Id.
The informal procedure has been criticized because United States Attorneys often have little
experience in securities law. It has been argued that the informal procedure, whereby the SEC
does not make a determination of whether there has been criminal conduct, "can result in
criminal prosecutions which are not part of any rational or structured enforcement policy."
Kronstein, SEC Practice: The Shadow of CriminalProsecution over SEC Investigations, 8 SEc.
REG. L.J. 145, 147 (1980). The informal procedure was approved, however, in United States v.
Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 917 (1979). See Mathews, Criminal
Prosecutionsunder the Federal Security Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC CriminalCases, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 902, 916 (1971), for an explanation of the
factors considered in bringing criminal charges against a defendant.
51SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
51 Id. at 11.
55Id. See note 87 infra.
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"expand the Justice Department's access to information and to encourage cooperation between the SEC and the Justice Department in
investigating illegal corporate payments." ' 56 Lastly, the SEC argued
that a securities investigation, unlike a civil tax57 investigation, was
independent of the Justice Department's control.
After analyzing the tax cases, the court, in a panel opinion,
concluded that the LaSalle rule was inapplicable to SEC subpoenas.
The panel reasoned that the relationship between the Department of
Justice and the SEC was not "inherently intertwined" as was the

SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
This intent can be gleaned from the Senate Report to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The SEC has thus developed considerable expertise in investigation [sic] corrupt
overseas payments. This same expertise can be put to work in investigating potential
violations of the anti-bribery provisions of this legislation. If this investigative responsibility were to be assigned solely to the Justice Department, as some have
advocated, that agency would have to duplicate the investigative capability already
in the SEC at a greater cost to the Government.
It should be emphasized that while the SEC investigates potential violations of
the securities laws, the only remedy it can bring on its own is an injunctive action.
When the SEC believes it has compiled enough evidence for a criminal action, it
refers the case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. This same division
of responsibility would also apply with respect to the antibribery provisions of this
legislation.
The committee expects that close cooperation will develop between the SEC
and the Justice Department at the earliest stage of any investigation in order to
insure that the evidence needed for a criminal prosecution does not become stale.
S. RFp. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N-ws
4098, 4109. See also 17 C.F.R. § 241.17099 IV (1980).
51 SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
The SEC has authority to settle civil suits even after a formal recommendation is made to the
Justice Department. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (1980). The Commission, however, cannot affect
any criminal proceedings with its settlement of the civil suit. Id.
Dresser argued that the presence of two SEC attorneys on the Justice Department Task
Force precluded independent investigations, Answering Brief of the SEC, Appellee at 30, SEC v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion), but the district court found
no impropriety since these attorneys had not worked on the Dresser investigation while with the
SEC. Id. See United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that presence
of appointed special assistant United States Attorney in grand jury proceedings did not require
disqualification on grounds that he had been involved in civil suit against defendant); United
States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (in view of factual circumstances, it
was proper for SEC attorney who had conducted civil investigation of defendant to participate
in grand jury proceedings against him). But cf. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 573 F.2d
936, 934-44 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979) (holding that presence of IRS
attorney who participated in civil investigation of defendant was improper). See Mathews, supra
note 52, at 920, and Comment, supra note 31, at 634-35, for brief discussions of the changing
attitudes with respect to the propriety of having SEC and IRS attorneys participate in grand jury
proceedings.
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relationship between the Department of Justice and the IRS.58 More
importantly, the court examined the national interests to be protected. It recognized that unlike a tax investigation where the sole
object is to recover money owed the government, violations of the
securities laws must be quickly remedied so as not to cause substantial
harm to the public. 9
Although the court agreed that LaSalle was inapposite, it rejected the government's argument that Congress intended the Justice
Department to have unlimited access to the product of the SEC's civil
discovery. 60 It therefore modified 6 ' the subpoena order to prevent
the SEC from transferring any documents to the Department of Justice. Such a modification was intended to ensure that the criminal and

SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 17 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
The court based this conclusion on two factors. First, it noted that the IRS and SEC provisions
pertaining to settlements are different. See note 57 supra. Second, it relied on the Senate Report
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which stated that - '[tlhe arrangements which the committee expects the SEC and Justice to work out on criminal matters is [sic] in no way intended to cast
doubt upon the authority of the SEC to prosecute and defend its own civil litigation.' " No.
78-1702, slip op. at 18 n.38 (quoting S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4098, 4109).
" SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel
opinion). That substantial harm would result is obvious. One need only examine the harm
resulting from rule lOb-5 violations to appreciate this.
60 Id. at 18. The government based its argument on passages from the Senate Report to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See note 56 supra. Judge Bazelon, however, interpreted this
report as indicating that the status quo should be preserved. "[T]he legislative history stresses
that the Act was meant to preserve the independence and separation of the two agencies, and to
maintain the traditional relationship between civil and criminal investigations." SEC v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 20 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
"I SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 28 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
Such a modification was not without precedent. In SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), the SEC brought an action against Judson Streicher charging him with violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Shortly after the civil suit began, the United States Attorney
began an investigation into criminal violations of the same act. Grand jury subpoenas were
issued for Streicher's records. The agency wanted to take the deposition of Streicher, but he
moved for a protective order which the Commission granted until termination of the parallel
criminal proceeding. Id. at 684. The district court vacated the protective order for two reasons.
First, it concluded that Streicher's fifth amendment rights would not be violated if discovery
were granted. Id. at 685-86. Second, the court found that the conduct of the Commission did not
justify a protective order. The court stated that a protective order should be granted only where
the degree of cooperation between the SEC and the Justice Department is unusually prejudicial.
In an effort to eliminate any taint of unfairness, however, the court ordered the Commission to
withhold any information gathered in the course of discovery. Id. at 687.
In one sense, this middle ground approach aided the defendant because he did not have to
invoke his fifth amendment privilege in order to avoid prejudice in the criminal suit. Where the
fifth amendment privilege is invoked in a civil suit, the court is allowed to draw an adverse
inference. SEC v. Vesco, [1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,777, at 93,386 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
On the other hand, had the court denied enforcement, the defendant would not have been
prejudiced in the criminal suit. In addition, progress in the civil suit would have been hampered.
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civil enforcement proceedings would be kept separate, and that the
criminal discovery and grand jury processes would thus be safeguarded.6 2 A dissenting opinion characterized the panel's action as
judicial legislation .6 The dissent found no valid reason to restrict the
flow of information from the SEC to the Justice Department and
stated that such a restriction was contrary to legislative intent. 4
Both the SEC and Dresser applied for a rehearing which was
granted.6 5 The court, sitting en banc, first examined parallel proceedings in general and established as its underlying premise that "the
Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings." ' 6 The court quoted
United States v. Kordel,6 7 the principal Supreme Court case dealing
with parallel proceedings, wherein the Supreme Court stated that "it
would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a governmental
agency. . . to invariably. . . choose either to forgo recommendation
of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil

Another innovative method of protecting a defendant is for the court to grant use immunity
for any statements made at the deposition. In Vesco, the court refused to allow discovery unless
use immunity was granted to the defendant. Id. at 93,389-90. The SEC petitioned for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate the order. In SEC v. Stewart, 476 F.2d 755, 759
(2d Cir. 1973), a majority of the court of appeals concluded that mandamus was not warranted
in such a case, and did not reach the merits. Judge Mulligan, concurring, went further and
explained that it was error to condition discovery upon a grant of immunity. Id. at 759
(Mulligan, J., concurring). According to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), certain procedures
must be followed in order to gain immunity. Immunity must be requested by the United States
Attorney, and cannot be initiated by the court. 476 F.2d at 759 (Mulligan, J., concurring).
Furthermore, the witness must specifically claim immunity. Id. at 759 (citing H.R. REP. No.
91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 4005, 4008).
Judge Timber, dissenting, stated that he would have granted mandamus, and expressed fear that
the SEC enforcement powers were being impaired. 476 F.2d at 766 (Timber, J., dissenting).
62 SEC v. Dresser Indus., No. 78-1702, slip op. at 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel opinion).
63 Id., dissenting slip op. at 2 (Robb, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1 (Robb, J., dissenting). Judge Robb found the court's order to be directly contrary
to 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d) (1976), which directs that any evidence obtained may be transmitted to
the Justice Department.
6S The SEC saw the decision as a threat to its enforcement powers. Dresser objected to the
fact that the LaSalle rule had not been followed.
628 F.2d at 1375.
67 397 U.S. 1 (1970). Scarcely a case dealing with parallel proceedings can be found which
does not cite Kordel for the proposition that the government may institute concurrent civil and
criminal proceedings. E.g., Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (relied on
Kordel to deny stay of civil proceedings where defendant was under indictment), United States
v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (concurrent civil and criminal prosecutions
allowed, but defendant may show that civil procedure was not used in good faith); SEC v.
United Brands Co., [1975] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,357, at 98,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(federal government may pursue parallel civil and criminal suits).
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proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial." 8 The
en banc court did not kill all hope of ever having a subpoena quashed,
however, since it did state that parallel proceedings might be blocked
where there are special circumstances in which the defendant's rights
might be substantially prejudiced.69 It viewed the case at bar as a
weak one for staying the investigation because "no indictment had
been returned; no Fifth Amendment privilege was threatened; [Fed.
R. Crim. P.16(b)] had not come into effect; and the SEC subpoena
70
did not require Dresser to reveal the basis for its defense."
Having decided what the outcome would be under general principles of parallel proceedings, the court turned to consider whether
these general principles were modified by LaSalle. After scrutinizing
both the IRS and SEC statutory schemes, the court concluded that
there were substantial differences which warranted the imposition of
397 U.S. at 11-12. The Court stated, however, that:
We do not deal here with a case where the Government has brought a civil
action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the
defendant in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution; nor
with a case where the defendant is without counsel or reasonably fears prejudice
from adverse pretrial publicity or other unfair injury; nor with any other special
circumstances that might suggest the unconstitutionality or even the impropriety of
this criminal prosecution.
Id. From this passage it is evident that although Kordel sets up a basic principle with respect to
parallel proceedings, it does not give much guidance in the majority of cases. For example, it
does not cover situations such as those in United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio
1970) and United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965). In Parrott, the SEC failed
to advise the defendant that a criminal referral to the Justice Department had been made before
requiring him to testify in response to a subpoena. The case had been dormant in the Justice
Department office for approximately one year. Id. at 198. The court held that the Commission
could not bring a parallel civil proceeding in order to obtain evidence for a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Id. at 202. Because the defendant was not warned of the criminal prosecution, he
could very well have incriminated himself. Id. at 201. The court based its decision to dismiss the
indictment on the fact that there was pre-indictment delay which violated the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial. Accord, United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d at 638, 647 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979) (held improper for SEC to hide criminal recommendation from defendant, although misconduct was held not to require drastic remedy of dismissal of
indictment).
In Rand, the FDA used the civil proceeding to obtain evidence for the criminal action. The
evidence obtained was irrelevant to the civil proceeding, and the defendant had not been
warned of the criminal prosecution. 308 F. Supp. at 234. Thus, the court dismissed the indictment. Id. at 238. For a detailed discussion of self-incrimination problems, see Mathews, supra
note 52, at 922-34.
69 628 F.2d at 1377.
Other than where there is specific evidence of agency bad faith or malicious
governmental tactics, the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after
completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious
offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same
matter.
Id. at 1375-76 (emphasis added).
10628 F.2d at 1376.
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two different rules. 7' Once the IRS makes a criminal recommendation to the Justice Department, for all "practical" purposes its authority ceases.7 2 Under the security laws, however, the SEC retains full
power over investigations and enforcement actions73 even after a
criminal investigation by the Justice Department has begun. The
court found that the investigative provisions of the Securities Acts
were far broader than those provided in section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code as interpreted in LaSalle. 74 Moreover, in order to
protect the public, the SEC must be able to respond rapidly to suspected violations of the securities laws. Reasoning that "the validity of
summonses or subpoenas 'depends ultimately on whether they were
among those authorized by Congress,' 75 the court concluded that
76
the subpoena was enforceable.
Once the statutory argument was lost, Dresser attempted to invoke the policy interests put forth in LaSalle. The court, however,
explained that it was not necessary to examine these policy interests in
the SEC context. 77 The LaSalle Court only directed its attention to
these policy interests after it had determined that the IRS had no
"practical authorized purpose" for continuing a civil investigation
once a referral had been made. The policy interests were invoked only
in order to explain why a proplylactic rule prohibiting the use of a

11Id.
72

at 1378-80.
Compare note 39 supra and accompanying text with note 45 supra and accompanying

text.
11 "The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person had violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of
this [Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976). Clearly there is no limitation which would restrict the
agency's authority to investigate once a criminal recommendation was made.
11 IRS summonses are limited to four civil purposes. See note 10 supra. The SEC can
investigate any violations of the Securities Acts. SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous Inc., [1980] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,532, at 97,773 (10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d
1018, 1022-24 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979). See note 50 supra.
's628 F.2d at 1380 (quoting LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 307). The SEC's subpoena power derives
from the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976).
For the purpose of all investigations which, in the opinion of the Commission,
are necessary and proper for the enforcement of this [Act], any member of the
Commission or any officer or officers designated by it are empowered to administer
oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Commission deems relevant
or material to the inquiry. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such
documentary evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any
territory at any designated place of hearing.
Id. § 77s(b).
76 628 F.2d at 1380.
77 Id.
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summons after referral was warranted. 78 Since the SEC had "legitimate investigative authority" 7 9 to conduct investigations after referral,8 0 these policy interests did not come into play. Furthermore, the
court determined that the policy interests of LaSalle were not even
8
applicable in the instant case. '

Dresser agreed that the first policy consideration espoused in
LaSalle, namely that the Justice Department's right to criminal discovery should not be broadened, was inapplicable. 82 Dresser argued,
however, that the subpoena should not be enforced in order to avoid
infringement upon the role of the grand jury. This infringement was
likely to occur in two respects. Dresser contended that the secrecy
provisions of the grand jury would be violated, and that the SEC
could exert influence by selecting which documents to send to the
grand jury. 83 The court responded to these arguments by stating that
the secrecy provisions only apply to matters occurring before the
Id.
Id. at 1280-81.
80 See note 74 supra.
11 628 F.2d at 1381.
78

71

82

Id.

81 Id. at 1382-83. The traditional rule of grand jury secrecy has been codified, and states:
(2) General Rule. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of
a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as
otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on
any person except in accordance with this rule.
FED. R. CrM. P. 6(e)(2). The traditional rationales for this rule are the following:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3)
to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness who may testify
before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with
respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the
expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). See Pittsburgh Plateglass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Malatesta, 583
F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 962 (1979).
It should be noted that under FED. R. CRM. P. 6(e)(2)(A)(i) any information obtained by
the grand jury is obtainable by a government attorney in order to enforce federal criminal law.
An SEC attorney is not a "government attorney." See In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 309 F.2d
440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962). Under FED. R. CriM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), however, disclosure may be made
to "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to
assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
federal criminal law." An SEC attorney is included in "government personnel." In Re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 445 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D.R.I. 1978).
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grand jury, 84 and that the second argument was purely speculative. In
picture,
any case, in order to avoid giving the grand jury a distorted
85
Dresser could have supplied it with all the documents.
Finally, the court turned to the modification of the subpoena
order which was made by a panel of the court. The court discussed
several reasons why this modification was improper.8 6 First, neither
the SEC nor Dresser requested such an order. Second, the relevant
statutes and legislative history all indicated that Congress intended the
87
SEC to be able to transmit information to the Justice Department.
Third, there was little or no precedent for such an order.88 Lastly,
such a modification served no compelling purpose and would only
interfere with enforcement of the securities laws.8 9

8 "[When] testimony or data is sought for its own sake-for its intrinsic value in the
furtherance of a lawful investigation-rather than to learn what took place before the
grand jury, it is not a valid defense to disclosure that the same information was
revealed to a grand jury or that the same documents had been or were presently
being, examined by a grand jury."
Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1382 (quoting United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52,
54 (2d Cir. 1960)). See United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979). The court noted that the documents in question were created by the
Dresser Corporation and that their production would not reveal what occurred before the grand
jury. 628 F.2d at 1383.
85 628 F.2d at 32.
88 Id. at 1384.
87 Id. at 1385. The SEC has specific statutory authority to transmit evidence to the Attorney
General who may, at his discretion, institute criminal proceedings. See note 51 supra. The
legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see note 56 supra, also indicates that the
SEC is authorized to transmit information to the Justice Department. Were it not able to do so,
it would make no sense to have the SEC investigate corporate bribery since the Act makes it a
crime to make foreign bribes, and the SEC cannot conduct its own prosecutions. Responsibility
for criminal prosecutions rests with the Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1976).
8 628 F.2d at 1386. The court was aware of SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). See note 61 supra. It correctly pointed out, however, that Gilbert did not cite any
precedent for its order, and gave no reason for it other than that the court should prevent the
possibility of abuse. Cf. Gellis v. Casey, 338 F. Supp. 651, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that
mere possibility of criminal proceedings was not sufficient cause to stay civil administrative
proceeding).
89 628 F.2d 1387. Dresser unsuccessfully argued that enforcement of the security laws would
not be impaired if discovery were stayed as in LaSalle. Petition for Rehearing en bane at 8, SEC
v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane). It correctly interpreted the
LaSalle decision as only limiting discovery by the IRS, and not the pursuit of civil remedies. See
LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 318. Because of this, Dresser reasoned that the SEC would still be able to
obtain injunctive relief under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976), and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). The SEC would supposedly already
have been able to obtain the information necessary to proceed. Any additional information could
be obtained through an exception to the grand jury secrecy rule, FED. R. ClUM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
Dresser should not have been penalized because the SEC transmitted information before it had
gathered sufficient evidence to seek a remedy other than enforcement.
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The Dresser court was primarily concerned with whether the
criminal recommendation part of the LaSalle test was applicable to
the SEC. In SEC v. OKC Corp., 90 the district court for the southern
district of Texas dealt with the LaSalle test in toto. On March 27,
1978, the SEC began a civil investigation of OKC Corporation in
order to determine whether certain persons were violating or about to
violate sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.9 1 During the course of this investigation the SEC issued a
subpoena to OKC. The corporation failed to comply with the subpoena, and the agency filed an enforcement action. OKC attacked the
subpoena by asserting, among other things, that a criminal

This argument is subject to several objections. First, the SEC should be encouraged to make
early referrals to the Justice Department so that the criminal case can be properly prepared
without incurring any statute of limitations problems. United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). See Senate Report, supra note 56. This is
consistent with the defendant's right to a speedy trial. " '[T]he constitutional guarantee protects
against undue delays in presenting a formal charge as well as delays between indictment and
trial.' " United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965) (quoting Mann v. United
States, 304 F.2d 394, 396-97 n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896 (1962)).
Second, the SEC might not have been able to obtain additional information from the grand
jury. FED. R. CuM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) provides that disclosures may be made "when so directed by
a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." In enacting rule 6(e) there
was "no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement
purposes." S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 527, 532. Whether disclosure would be made to the SEC in a civil investigation is open
to argument since it is not clear whether such an investigation is "preliminary to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding." ED. R. CRiuM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443-44 (3d Cir. 1962) (disclosure denied to SEC since no judicial proceeding
in progress, and investigation may never result in judicial proceeding) and In re Proceedings
before Grand Jury for District of Nevada, 487 F. Supp. 1098, 1101-02 (D. Nev. 1980) (testimony
not disclosed, since Gaming Control Commission investigation not judicial proceeding) with
SEC v. Everest Management Corp., [1980] 560 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(SEC granted access to original grand jury documents in order to save costly and time consuming
discovery by the SEC) and United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(testimony revealed to FTC for use in investigation).
The Supreme Court has adopted a fairly liberal standard with respect to granting disclosure
of grand jury testimony. Although a "particular need" must still be shown, it is much easier to
meet this test than it had been traditionally. Such a grant is still completely discretionary with
the court. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-75 (1966). Courts are also more likely
to grant disclosure once grand jury proceedings are terminated. See United States v. Northside
Realty Assoc., 613 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1980); Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961, 967 (7th
Cir. 1977); Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29, 38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 904 (1963).
An alternative method of obtaining grand jury testimony is to have an agency attorney
appointed Special Attorney. E.g., In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978). See note 57 supra.
11 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
91Id. at 1033-34.
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recommendation by the Department of Energy to the Justice Depart92
ment precluded further SEC investigation.
OKC based its argument on the Supreme Court decisions in
Donaldson and LaSalle. The court, however, pointed out that these
cases contemplated recommendations by the agency issuing the subpoena. 3 Where a different agency makes a recommendation based
on similar facts and alleging violation of a completely different statute, the policy reasons identified in LaSalle for not enforcing the
subpoena do not come into play. 4 The court stated that these interests become operative only if the non-referring agency actively assists
the Department of Justice. After concluding that cooperation between
the Justice Department and the non-referring agency was neither
inevitable nor expected, the court stated that it was "unwilling to hold
as a matter of law that a non-referring agency's investigation, commenced independently of a criminal investigation referred by a difference agency, must cease simply because of the pendency of the inde95
pendent criminal investigation.
Judge Higginbotham advocated instead a good faith analysisone which "looks to the circumstances of the particular investigation."9' 6 The court must examine the non-referring agency's role in
the criminal prosecution and decide whether the investigation was
carried out in good faith, or whether the agency issued the subpoena
for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.
This good faith inquiry must look to the actions and intent of the
agency as an institution and not to the intent of any particular

o1 Id. at 1034. OKC Corp. also argued that the subpoena was unenforceable because of the
attorney-client privilege. This claim was found to be without merit. Id. at 1040.
General rules pertaining to the attorney-client privilege apply in the corporate context.
"'There must be an attorney-client relationship and any communication to the attorney must be
made in confidence, in the attorney's professional capacity, for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice or legal assistance." J. GRUFF, supra note 3, § 20.04, at 20-35. The corporate context
presents some special problems. One such problem involves the scope of the privilege. Recently,
in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), the Court rejected the "control group" test
which protected only communications "to those officers who play a 'substantial role' in deciding
and directing a corporation's legal response." Id.at 684. Justice Rehnquist perceived two problems with such a test. First, he found that "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice." Id. at 683. Second, he noted that there is no
universal definition of the term "control group." Id. at 684. Although the Court rejected this
test, it declined to devise a broad rule to protect corporate communications, preferring instead to
proceed on a case by case basis. Id. at 686.
11 474 F. Supp. at 1037.
14 Id. at 1038.
95

Id.

96 Id.
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agent.9 7 Since the SEC investigation began long before the referral
by the Department of Energy, and the SEC stated a valid civil purpose for the subpoena, the OKC Corp. court concluded that the SEC
was acting in good faith,9 8 and that the subpoena should be enforced.
AN EVALUATION
An examination of LaSalle and the SEC cases dealing with the
LaSalle rule reveals several disturbing problems. The LaSalle Court
clearly was misguided with respect to its reliance upon criminal recommendation as the cut-off point for the imposition of a prophylactic
rule. Modern provisions governing criminal discovery are much more
restrictive than those dealing with civil discovery. 99 Nonetheless, the
Court's fear that criminal discovery would be expanded beyond permissible bounds were the subpoena enforced was unfounded because
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable until after
the defendant is indicted. 00
An IRS summons should be enforced at least until indictment.
Once an indictment is returned, there is the very real danger that
criminal discovery will be expanded as a result of the IRS statutory
scheme, which contemplates cooperation with the Justice Department. 10 ' Such an expansion is improper because the defendant's
fourth and fifth amendment 0 2 rights, which are the traditional

97

Id.

Id. at 1039.
a See Comment, FederalDiscovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52 TUL.
L. REv. 769, 780 (1978). Criminal discovery was traditionally limited so as to avoid any possible
infringement upon the defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id. at 774. Although the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expanded the availability of discovery somewhat, this basic
rationale still holds true today. Id.
11 Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1381: Comment, supra note 31, at 643; Developments, supra note 6,
at 1320, 1335.
"I' See notes 40-41 supra. Judge Edwards, in a concurring opinion in Dresser, seemed to
indicate that upon indictment of the defendant there might be reason to refuse enforcement of
the subpoena. "Once an indictment has issued, the policy interest expressed in United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978), concerning the impermissibility of broadening the
scope of criminal discovery through the summons authority of an agency, may come into play."
Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1391 (Edwards, J., concurring).
101The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is a personal one and cannot be
invoked by "artificial organizations." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). Such an
organization has been defined as:
an oganization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members. The group must be relatively well organized and structured, and not
merely a loose, informal association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set of
organizational records, and recognize rights in its members of control and access of
them.
98
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reasons for limiting criminal discovery, may be vitiated. This unilateral
expansion of criminal discovery may well render the criminal trial
unfair, resulting in a denial of due process. 10 3 Furthermore, some
courts have held that such an expansion violates the integrity of the
criminal process, and that public policy demands an end to such
abuses. 10 4 Therefore, in order to protect the defendant's constitutional rights, an IRS summons should not be enforced after indictment. 105

Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1974). Corporations are included in such a definition.
With respect to corporate records, an individual acting in his official capacity may not assert his
personal privilege. Were it otherwise, the rule that a corporation cannot claim privilege would
be undermined. Id. at 90. The distinction between private and business papers is thus a critical
one, and the term private papers is narrowly construed by the courts.
Although the officer of a corporation cannot assert the privilege on behalf of the corporation, he may assert it if he would be personally incriminated. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 7. Where no
one is able to answer the subpoena without self-incrimination, the Kordel Court stated that the
appropriate remedy would be for the court to grant "a protective order . . . postponing civil
discovery until termination of the criminal action." Id. at 9. See SEC v. Vesco, [1973] FED. SEC.
REC. L. REP. (CCH) P 93,777, at 93,389 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendants could not respond to
interrogatories without risk of self-incrimination, therefore court stayed discovery unless immunity granted).
Even when the privilege is applicable, the fifth amendment is not violated absent an
element of compulsion. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976), and Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973), the Court held that a summons directed to a third party
did not violate the taxpayer's fifth amendment rights since the taxpayer was not compelled to do
anything. For an interesting discussion of the compulsion requirement of the fifth amendment,
see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 (1976), where the Court discussed the interaction between the fourth and fifth amendments with respect to the seizure of business records.
Courts have generally followed Kordel in holding that forcing the defendant to choose
between testifying or asserting the fifth amendment does not violate due process. E.g., SEC v.
United Brands Co., [1975] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,357, at 98,776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)- Gellis
v. Casey, 338 F. Supp. 651, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But cJ. SEC v. Vesco, [1973] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
93,777, at 93,387 (defendant would suffer grave, irreparable civil and criminal
consequences if forced to choose between testifying or invoking fifth amendment).
103 Due process precludes even the "probability of unfairness" in a criminal trial. In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Courts have generally recognized this standard. See, e.g..
United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.D.C. 1965). But cf. Kordel. 397 U.S. at 11
(government use of evidence obtained in civil proceeding not violative of due process): United
States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 389
U.S. 425 (1967) (fact that information becomes available to prosecution is merely "natural
by-product" of judicial proceeding, not discovery initiated by government). For a discussion of
the expansion of criminal discovery as a violation of due process, see Comment, supra note 99, at
784-87.
104 E.g., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied. 371 U.S. 955
(1963).
1"I The rights of the parties should be fixed as of the time of the hearing, not when the
summons is issued. Developments, supra note 6, at 1328 & n.104. Contra. United States v.
Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 461 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970).
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The second policy consideration invoked by the Court was infringement upon the role of the grand jury. Issuance of an agency
subpoena, however, does not infringe upon the grand jury's role,
which is to investigate and prosecute suspected criminal violations of
law. 0 6 There is nothing in the Constitution to the effect that the
grand jury is the sole body authorized to investigate criminally. The
fifth amendment merely states that "no person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury." 107 Enforcement of an agency subpoena
should not be denied in an attempt to "keep things separate out of a
sense of judicial propriety or concern for appearances." 108
In addition, the scope of a grand jury subpoena is at least as
broad as that of an administrative agency subpoena.109 This being
the case, the defendant has nothing to complain about, since one way
or another, the government could have obtained the documents. 110
The only objection which could be raised is that the grand jury,
because it is completely disinterested, might be less inclined to use the
subpoena as a means of harassment. It has been suggested, however,
that this danger should be dealt with as an independent ground for
denying enforcement."' This suggestion appears valid since the issue
of harassment is related to the good faith of the agency. 112 It is only
natural, then, that harassment be dealt with under that doctrine.
Although the LaSalle rule is not required as a matter of strict
legal analysis, some justification for the rule has been advanced. The
rule has been viewed as allowing the defendant a period of grace
between the criminal referral and the indictment, during which there
is an opportunity to challenge the summons." 3 Such a grace period is
unwarranted, however, since even if the summons were issued immediately before indictment the defendant would have an opportunity to

106
Beavers

v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904).

107 U.S. Const. amend. V.

108Developments, supra note 6, at 1326.
109Developments, supra note 6, at 1312. See United States v. Cortese, 540 F.2d 640, 641 (3d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Matra, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973). "While agency
summonses may be roughly as broad as grand jury subpoenas in terms of jurisdiction and
relevance, summonses are subject to more restrictive procedural limitations." Developments,
supra note 6, at 1312. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974). For a
discussion of the stricter procedural requirements of administrative subpoenas, see Comment,
supra note 31, at 642-43 n.121; Developments, supra note 6, at 1312-13.
11 See note 57 supra.
m Developments, supra note 6, at 1326-27.
112Where a subpoena is issued in order to harass, it clearly fails the good faith test of Powell,
which requires the subpoena to have been issued for a legitimate purpose. See note 32 supro.
113 Developments, supra note 6, at 1328.
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challenge its validity. The defendant could refuse to comply with the
summons and the agency would be forced to apply to the district court
for enforcement1 4 at which time the defendant could object. 1 5 A
7
temporary stay could be granted"' if an appeal were necessary."
Another commentator has argued that removing the recommendation
limitation would allow the agency to "wield an unrestrained summons power, conditioned only upon proof of a good faith issuance."" ' 8 It may well be that the IRS has a great deal of power. Still,
"1 The district court has the power to order compliance with SEC subpoenas. Securities Act
of 1933, U.S.C. § 77t(c) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). The
defendant also has another alternative. He may move to quash at the agency level. Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1963).
Any person to whom a subpoena is directed may, prior to the time specified therein
for compliance, but in no event more than 5 days after the date of service of such
subpoena, apply to the hearing officer, or if he is unavailable, to the Commission, to
quash or modify such subpoena, accompanying such application with a brief statement of the reasons therefore.
17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(2) (1980). If the motion is denied, review may be had.
In any proceeding in which an initial decision is made by a hearing officer, any
party to the proceeding, and any person who would have been entitled to judicial
review of the final order entered in the proceeding if the Commission itself had made
the initial decision, may file a petition for Commission review of the initial decision.
Id. § 201.17(a). If the Commission does not rule in the defendant's favor, he may refuse to
comply, and the Commission will be forced to seek enforcement in the federal courts. It should
be noted that the agency must bring the controversy before the court in an enforcement
proceeding. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. at 446. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d
487, 490 (8th Cir. 1966). The courts will not entertain a subpoenaed party's motion to quash.
375 U.S. at 446. Furthermore, although the Securities Acts provide for contempt penalties, e.g.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78u(c) (1976), the Supreme Court has held that a similar statute "on its face does not apply
where the witness appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons. It only prescribes punishment where the witness 'neglects' either to appear or to produce." 375 U.S. at 447.
Where the defendant fails to comply with a court order, however, a separate proceeding may be
instituted to cite the party for civil contempt. J. GnuRF, supra note 3, § 21.02(1), at 21-10.
I'sAccording to Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943), no substantive
defenses may be raised at an enforcement proceeding. "If parties under investigation could
contest substantive issues in an enforcement proceeding, when the agency lacks the information
to establish its case, administrative investigations would be foreclosed or at least substantially
delayed." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847, 852 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 856 (1981). See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213
(1946). Appropriate defenses to the enforcement of the subpoena may be raised. Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
116 E.g., NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1979) (discovery
stayed pending appeal); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1969).
117 The enforcement order of the district court is a final order and thus appealable. Ellis v.
ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 442 (1915); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. United States Equal Educ. Opp. Comm'n., 398 F.2d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir.
1963).
" Stroud, supra note 14, at 172. The author believes that if the "prior to recommendation"
part of the Donaldson test were excised, the IRS would be able to obtain incriminating evidence
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one must remember that this power was granted by Congress, and
that any restrictions on this power should be imposed for constitutional reasons,119 or as a result of legislative action.
The Dresser Court, in an en banc decision, correctly determined
that LaSalle was inapplicable in the context of the SEC, although its
rationale was not very convincing as a matter of statutory construction. The critical conclusion was that under the Internal Revenue
scheme the Service's authority to issue a summons ends for all practical purposes upon criminal referral. Under the SEC scheme, however,
the agency's subpoena power is not confined to four purposes and
continues undiminished after a referral. 20 This analysis is ironic in
that after stating that the validity of a summons depends on whether
it was authorized by Congress, the court proceeded to consider IRS
practice in order to determine the extent of its summons authority.
What the agency voluntarily chooses to do in practice is irrelevant in
matters of statutory interpretation. Also, it is important to note that
the Dresser court analyzed the SEC statutory scheme in terms of the
scope of SEC power.' 2' Whether the scope of the subpoena power is
broad or narrow does not really pertain to the crucial issue: does the
power continue after referral? Finally, it should be noted that the
Dresser court misinterpreted LaSalle. The Supreme Court did not
conclude that IRS summons authority ceases upon criminal recommendation. On the contrary, the Court stated that "the IRS could use
its summons authority under Section 7602 to uncover information...
regardless of the status of the criminal case." The Court did not base
its restriction of IRS summons authority upon an analysis of IRS
practice, but upon the need for a prophylactic.

from the taxpayer, and the taxpayer would not be able to obtain equitable relief in the form of
an injunction or mandamus since the criminal prosecution defense is an adequate remedy at law.
See United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 854 (5th Cir. 1969). Finally, he argued that
"summons enforcement [could] not be curtailed by alleging an unconstitutional search and
seizure." Stroud, supra note 14, at 173. The general attitude of the courts appears to be contrary
to this view, however. "These weapons, to be sure, are potent, but hardly dispensable in the
protection of the investing public and the fairness and honesty of the Nation's financial markets."
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979).
"1 Indeed, two of the most common reasons why courts have refused enforcement of summonses are infringement upon the party's fifth amendment rights and violations of procedural
due process.
120 There can be no question that the SEC is empowered to continue its investigation after
referral since there is no statutory language which even suggests that the Commission's powers
are restricted upon referral. See note 50 supra. Cf. note 10 supra (IRS summons authority
confined to four purposes).
121 628

F.2d at 1379.
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Perhaps the Dresser court's statutory analysis actually cloaks the
true rationale behind its decision. The IRS holds civil actions in
abeyance when the defendant is involved in criminal proceedings in
order to avoid any impropriety. 22 No policy reasons prevent such
procedure. The Service merely seeks money due the government and
postponement does not harm the public. The SEC, on the other hand,
cannot defer its civil investigation because of the possibility that the
public will be substantially harmed. 2 3 In short, both the IRS and
SEC are statutorily authorized to conduct civil investigations after a
criminal referral. Yet, policy considerations do not militate against a
delay in an IRS investigation, whereas public policy demands speedy
resolution of an SEC civil investigation. This realization seems to be at
the core of the Dresser court's decision, and is evidenced by the court's
examination of IRS practice instead of statutory authority. The fact
that the court came close to giving this policy reason as an "alternative" rationale for its decision further supports this analysis. It stated
that "the nature of the SEC's civil enforcement responsibilities required that the SEC retain full powers of investigation and civil
enforcement action, even after the Justice Department had begun a
criminal investigation."1 24 Furthermore, "fulfillment of the SEC's
civil enforcement responsibilities requires this conclusion."'' 25 The
court should have recognized that both the IRS and SEC have statutory authority after referral, and should have based its holding on the
fact that different policy considerations existed, as well as on the fact
that the defendant was not prejudiced.
A question remains as to whether the panel was correct in modifying the enforcement order to provide that no information be passed
to the Justice Department. In deciding this issue, the en banc court
adhered to a strict statutory construction theory. Judge Wright correctly observed that the SEC has statutory authority to transmit any
information or evidence obtained to the Justice Department, and that
the statute does not place any limitation on when such information
sharing is allowed. 26 Furthermore, the legislative history of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 27 supports the conclusion that such
cooperation was intended by Congress. 2 8 Finally, the defendant was

12

Stroud, supra note 14, at 159.

See note 59 supra.
628 F.2d at 1379.
125 Id. at 1380.
123
124

'6
"2
12

See note 50 supra.
P.L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
See note 56 supra.
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not prejudiced since the grand jury could easily have subpoenaed the
29
information. 1
As with IRS summonses, an automatic cut-off for SEC subpoena
enforcement should be imposed once a defendant is indicted. It is
clear that Congress intended to establish a close working relationship
between the SEC and the Justice Department. 130 One commentator
has gone so far as to state that "the SEC staff, in its investigations, is
effectively serving as an arm of Justice Department prosecutors." 131
Because of this close working relationship, criminal discovery would
be expanded beyond permissible bounds were subpoenas to be enforced after indictment. Refusal of enforcement is therefore necessary
to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
It should be pointed out that neither LaSalle nor Dresser contemplated the situation where an agency other than that conducting the
investigation makes a criminal referral to the Justice Department. In
OKC Corp., the court concluded that it could not hold as a matter of
law that an agency's investigation must cease as a result of another
agency's criminal recommendation.132 This conclusion is sound since
the criminal violation might be totally unrelated to the agency investi33
gation. If so, the civil inquiry would not prejudice the defendant. 1
Although the OKC Corp. court correctly held that the agency's power
did not cease after criminal referral as a matter of law, it stated that
the best analysis is to look at the particular circumstances of the case
to determine the non-referring agency's role in the criminal investigation.134 It concluded that if the subpoena were issued solely to obtain
See note 109 supra.
130

See note 56 supra.

Kronstein, supra note 52, at 145.
474 F. Supp. at 1038.
...In such a case, even if information did flow to the Justice Department, there could be no
meaningful expansion of criminal discovery since the information would be of no use to the
prosecution.
1 474 F. Supp. at 1038. The court relied heavily upon a tax case, United States v. Henry, 491
F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974). In.Henry, the taxpayer was served with an IRS summons after he was
indicted for violations of the federal narcotics laws. The court concluded that the summons was
issued solely to aid the criminal investigation. The court could have refused to enforce the
summons on this ground alone. It chose, instead, to refuse enforcement because of the "prior to
recommendation" part of Donaldson. Critical to the court's decision was the fact that the
taxpayer was under indictment. The fact that the summons was issued solely to aid the criminal
prosecution was significant because it indicated that if the subpoena had been enforced, it would
not only have "benefit[ed] the government in its prosecution of the criminal conspiracy case, but
could also have result[ed) in the deprivation of some of the taxpayer's Constitutional and other
rights." Id. at 704. The court recognized that Donaldson envisioned a referral for criminal tax
prosecution rather than a criminal prosecution totally unrelated to the tax laws. It concluded,
however, that where there was a strong possibility that relevant information would be supplied
to the prosecution were the summons enforced, "the use of the civil summons [was) as much an
131
"'
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evidence of criminality, it would be unenforceable because not in
good faith. 1 35 The court seems to have confused the issue of good
faith with that of criminal recommendation. As far as the criminal
recommendation issue is concerned, the good faith of the agency is
6
irrelevant. 13
Indeed, it is not even necessary to consider the recommendation issue if the summons is issued in bad faith since enforcement may properly be refused on this ground alone.
Where a defendant has been indicted, it is possible that criminal
discovery would be improperly expanded were the courts to allow
enforcement of another agency's subpoena. 137 In such a case, the
proper inquiry is whether there is a possibility that information relevant to the criminal proceeding will flow from the investigating
agency to the Justice Department. It should be stressed that unlike the
case where a defendant is indicted for violating a provision of an act
which the referring agency is charged with enforcing, indictment
should not necessarily constitute an automatic cut-off point. The
courts should examine the circumstances and decide on a case by case
basis whether enforcement should be denied. A crucial factor should
be the relationship between the criminal violation and the information sought through the subpoena. The central question is whether the
information would aid the prosecution in proving the criminal case. If
it would, and if it were possible that the information would be passed
to the Justice Department, enforcement should be refused.
Differences in statutory authority must be considered before
adopting the good faith part of the LaSalle test to other agency
summonses. With respect to LaSalle itself, the IRS statutory scheme
must be examined in order to determine whether it sanctions a criminal purpose defense. Interpretations of this scheme are quite varied.

abuse of process as if a criminal tax case had been recommended or had actually been begun."
Id. at 705. The Henry court preferred to base its decision on an "abuse of process" theory, rather
than on a lack of good faith.
"I United Sates v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974) demonstrated that the court could also
refuse enforcement on an "abuse of process" theory.
116The court seems to have misconstrued United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.
1974). Although in Henry the court found that the summons was issued for the sole purpose of
aiding the criminal prosecution, it based its decision on an abuse of process. Id. at 705. Because
the summons was issued to aid the prosecution, this abuse was sure to occur. The court offered
no opinion, however, about whether an abuse of process could occur if only one of the purposes
of the summons was to gather criminal information. The critical point is that the court must
determine whether relevant information would be passed to the prosecution, in which case an
abuse of process would result.
't Such was the case in United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974). It must be
remembered that the party in OKC Corp. had not been indicted. Therefore, there seems to be
no reason not to have enforced the summons. See Comment, supra note 31, at 643.

1981]

COMMENTS

One commentator believes that the statutory scheme clearly prohibits
the use of a Section 7602 summons for the purpose of gathering
evidence of criminality even though there is also a civil purpose to the
summons. 38 He suggests that IRS subpoenas be limited to purely
civil purposes and that any evidence of criminality be barred from use
at a criminal trial. 139 Another view is that there is nothing to prevent
the use of an IRS summons for criminal investigations alone.140 The
courts, on the other hand, have consistently held that it can be enforced as long as there is a civil purpose to the summons regardless of
whether a criminal purpose also exists.' 41 LaSalle and other courts
have correctly interpreted the vague provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.142 Although other views cannot be definitively rejected,
43
they are not as easily defended.

'3 Ise, Tax Fraudand ConstitutionalRights, B. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 1176, 1193-94 (1971).
This view is based on a strict reading of I.R.C. § 7602, which only contains language pertaining
to civil tax investigations. See note 10 supra. Ise also maintains that criminal tax investigations
are carried out by special agents who have no authority to issue summonses. But see note 143
infra. Consequently, he concludes that Congress did not intend the summons to be used in
criminal investigations.
139 Ise, supra note 138, at 1194. This solution is based on the commentator's belief that there is
no statutory authority to issue summonses which have any criminal purpose, and also on the
belief that the use of an IRS summons during a criminal investigation might well violate the
probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment. This is not a view held solely by Ise. See
Lipton, The Relationship Between the Civil and Criminal Penaltiesfor Tax Frauds, 1968 U. Ill.
L.F. 527, 533 n.40 (no statutory authority for summons used for civil and criminal investigations); Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigation, 45 F.R.D. 323, 329 (1968)
(summons should be enforced only if evidence obtained is barred from use in criminal prosecution).
140 Developments, supra note 6, at 1326. This view is based on the theory that the IRS should
be allowed to perform solely criminal investigations because section 7602 neither authorizes nor
prohibits such activity. Id.
4I E.g., LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 308-09; Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 532; United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 851 (5th Cir. 1969); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir.
1966). See Comment, supra note 31, at 624.
142 Nothing in I.R.C.
§ 7602 appears to allow investigations for both civil and criminal
purposes. Nevertheless, when a taxpayer submits a fraudulent tax return he is subject to criminal
penalties under I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207, and a civil penalty of 50% of any underpayment under
I.R.C. § 6653. I.R.C. § 6659(a)(2) provides that the penalty becomes part of the tax liability.
Since a summons may be issued to "determin[e] the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax," I.R.C. § 7602, it follows that a summons may be issued to investigate a fraudulent
tax return since a tax liability is attached to such a return. Where such an investigation is made,
the Service investigates the possibility of assessing the civil penalty, but must also be investigating
the criminal violation since both civil and criminal penalties are linked to the filing of a
fraudulent return. The civil and criminal elements are "inherently intertwined." LaSalle, 437
U.S. at 309.
"1' 437 U.S. at 316. One cannot examine the IRS summons power in a vacuum. A careful
scrutiny of the entire statutory scheme reveals that Congress intended a summons to be used to
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Whether the good faith test is of much use to the defendant
largely depends upon whether he is granted discovery rights. LaSalle
suggested that the taxpayer be granted discovery. 144 Unfortunately,
the Court did not expand upon this statement, and this has led to
45
considerable confusion. 1
In OKC Corp., the court applied the LaSalle good faith test to
the SEC, although not specifically centering on the criminal purpose
defense.14 The court can be criticized for assuming that the LaSalle

investigate both civil and criminal violations. See note 142 supra. Furthermore, special agents
investigating criminal violations are able to issue summonses. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7603-1(b)
(1980). Indeed it was a special agent who issued the agency summons in LaSalle.
The contrary view, that an IRS summons may be issued solely for a criminal purpose, also
seems weak. Proponents of this view rely on a version of the argument put forth in note 142
supra. Section § 7602 authorizes investigations solely for criminal purposes since such investigations subject the taxpayer to criminal sanctions under I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207, and are carried on to
determine the "correctness of any return." I.R.C. § 7602. What this argument fails to consider,
however, is that the filing of a fraudulent return at the same time entails civil penalties under
I.R.C. § 6653, and therefore any investigation also involves a civil purpose.
"1 437 U.S. at 316-17. Courts, however, have not agreed on what showing the defendant
must make in order to be entitled to discovery. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
stated:
At a minimum, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the identities of the
investigating parties, the date the investigation began, the dates the agent or agents
filed reports recommending prosecution, the date the district chief of the Intelligence
Division or Criminal Investigation Division reviewed the recommendation, the date
the Office of Regional Counsel referred the matter for prosecution, and the dates of
all summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Furthermore, the taxpayer should be
entitled to discover the nature of any contacts, relating to and during the investigation, between the investigating agents and officials of the Department of Justice.
United States v. Genser (Genser II), 595 F.2d 146, 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928
(1979). According to United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a defendant
is only entitled to discovery if he takes himself "out of the class of the ordinary taxpayer, whose
efforts at seeking discovery would, if allowed universally, obviously to be too burdensome to the
Internal Revenue Service." Id. at 231-32.
14
For an excellent discussion of the scope and extent of the taxpayer's right of discovery, see
Comment, supra note 31, at 637-43, in which the author suggests a sensible solution. The
proposed solution would introduce a single evidentiary hearing where the IRS would be required
to file an affidavit including certain basic items of information. The summoned party would
then be required to make a substantial showing as to why the summons should not be enforced.
If such showing were made, the IRS would be permitted to present evidence and witnesses. If
substantial questions still remained, further discovery could be ordered. Id. at 640-41. This
procedure has the advantage of being time efficient, and yet allowing the taxpayer an opportunity to prove bad faith.
146 474 F. Supp. at 1035. The court was actually concerned with the effect of a recommendation to the Justice Department by another agency. See notes 106-12 supra and accompanying
text. The LaSalle good faith test was recently dealt with by the Third Circuit in SEC v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). In Wheeling, the
subpoenaed party claimed that the summons was not issued in good faith since the agency had
been prodded to make the investigation by a powerful United States Senator. The court, sitting
en bane, made a distinction between agency bad faith and agency acquiesence in an abuse of its
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good faith standard applies to the SEC. 47 Whether the sole criminal
purpose defense is applicable to a particular agency should depend
upon whether that agency has been authorized by Congress to conduct investigations solely to uncover evidence of criminality. 48 The
court should have analyzed the SEC statutory scheme in order to
make such a determination. Had it done so, it would have found that
the statutes strongly indicate that Congress intended the SEC to be
able to conduct solely criminal investigations. 149 Therefore, the criminal purpose defense should not be applied in the SEC context, although the other elements of good faith must still be complied with
when issuing a subpoena.15 0 At first sight, it appears that the SEC
power would be unlimited, since it has also been argued that the SEC
should be able to obtain subpoena enforcement at any time prior to
indictment. It must be remembered, however, that the criminal purpose defense is but one branch of the good faith test. The subpoena
would still have to meet the Powell standards of good faith.' 5 ' As a
practical matter, the elimination of the criminal purpose defense in
the SEC context would have little effect since it is a rare case in which
there is absolutely no civil purpose to an investigation. 152 In any case,

process, which in turn leads to an abuse of the court's process. Id.at 125. In the former case,
there is a conscious decision to pursue a meritless allegation. In the latter situation, the court's
process could be abused where the agency permits an influential third party to control the
investigation. These two situations constitute two distinct grounds for refusing summons enforcement. Id. at 125. The agency should "give congressional comments only as much deference as
they deserve on the merits." Id. at 126.
147 Indeed, this seems to be a common mistake among the lower courts. E.g., United States v.
Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330-31 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Even if it were common knowledge that the
good faith part of the LaSalle test applied to the SEC, which it certainly is not, the courts should
at least have acknowledged that such was the case. United States v. Handler, [1978] FED. SEC.
R. L. REP. (CCH) 96,519, at 94,026 (C.D. Cal. 1978); SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975]
95,357, at 98,775 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
FED. SEc. REG. L. REP. (CCH)
"4 Developments, supra note 6, at 1329. The opposite situation has arisen in grand jury
proceedings where the defendant claimed that the grand jury was investigating solely for a civil
purpose. E.g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); United States
v. Pennsalt Chem. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
149 See Developments, supra note 6, at 1329. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)
(1976) states that a summons may be issued "[f]or the purpose of all investigations which, in the
opinion of the Commission, are necessary and proper for the enforcement of [the Act]." The Act
criminalizes certain conduct without imposing civil penalties, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x,77w
(1976), as does the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78h(a) (1976).
Furthermore, the SEC investigates violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which has
criminal penalties. Clearly then, the SEC may investigate violations of these criminal provisions,
and issue a subpoena for that purpose.
150See note 32 supra.
151

Id.

151It is much more difficult to determine when an SEC investigation is solely for criminal
purposes since, unlike the IRS, civil and criminal investigations are not departmentalized. See
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even where there must be both a civil and criminal purpose, almost s
much criminal evidence can be compiled as would be in a purely
criminal investigation.
The above evaluation demonstrates that to resolve parallel enforcement issues by resorting to statutory interpretation inevitably
leads to confusion in the courts. It has been suggested that "the
relevant concern should not be whether the summons was issued for a
proper purpose, but rather whether the effect of enforcement will be
to obtain criminal discovery at a time when it would be improper." 153 It is thought that such a test applies uniformly to all
agencies "since it rests not on exegesis of varying statutory authority to
issue a summons, but rather on the duty of courts to oversee activity
which threatens to interfere with the safeguards erected around criminal trials." 15 Although the proposed test is a favorable one, it is
doubtful whether it would truly avoid problems of statutory interpretation. The test is merely another way of asking whether criminal
discovery would be impermissibly expanded. Such a decision necessarily entails an examination of the statutory scheme of the agency so as
to determine to what extent it envisions information sharing with the
Justice Department. If criminal discovery is not expanded, the court
must still determine whether the agency has authority to issue a
summons after recommendation. Thus the test accomplishes little in
the way of avoiding statutory interpretation. It redeems itself, however, in that it forces the court to focus on the danger which threatens
the criminal discovery process.
CONCLUSION
Subject to statutory and constitutional limitations, administrative
agencies should be free to investigate possible violations of law.
Dresser is extremely significant in that it indicates that the recommendation part of the LaSalle rule may be confined to the IRS context.
Since courts have not been called upon to consider the application of
the criminal recommendation rule to administrative agencies other
than the SEC, it is still too early to evaluate the total impact of
LaSalle.15 5 Unlike the criminal recommendation rule, however, the
[1976] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 446, at 1112 (Aug. 11, 1976) for an organization chart of the
SEC.
153 Developments, supra note 6, at 1329.
"1 Id. at 1329-30.
'55 In the great majority of cases, the cutoff point should be indictment, since for the most part
the various statutory schemes show no indication that upon referral to the Justice Department
the agency subpoena power is diminished. Indeed, most statutes do not even explicitly confer the
power to transfer information to the Justice Department. Where the statutory scheme provides

1981]

COMMENTS

good faith test has been applied to other agencies,15 6 although no case
could be found in which a subpoena was not enforced because of the
sole criminal purpose defense.
It was urged above that one limitation on the SEC's investigatory
power should be that upon indictment an SEC subpoena should not
be enforced. 5 7 Other less drastic methods for protecting a criminal
defendant are available, however. Although the SEC and the Justice
Department have a close working relationship which makes it inevitable that information will pass between them, 5 8 the SEC, unlike the
IRS, remains independent of the Justice Department even after a
criminal referral.15 9 Consequently, it might be possible to "build a
partial information barrier"'' l 0 between the SEC and the Justice Department by imposing a protective order such as that used by a panel
of the court of appeals in Dresser. Unfortunately, such a safeguard
cannot protect the criminal defendant against possible information
leaks. Also, application of this method to other agencies requires an
examination of each agency's statutory scheme to determine the feasibility of imposing such a "barrier." This entails additional problems of
statutory interpretation.
Another approach is to exclude any information obtained by the
Justice Department from the criminal trial.'" Nevertheless, the mere
fact that the Justice Department is able to inspect the evidence may
for criminal penalties, however, it is clear that such power must be allowed since most agencies
do not have the authority to criminally prosecute a defendant. Furthermore, in most instances
cooperation between the agency and the Justice Department can be expected, therefore significantly increasing the risk that criminal discovery will be expanded. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 13, 15
(1976) (Commodities Futures Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 1714 (1976) (Land Sales
Disclosure Commission); 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1976) (Federal Trade Commission); 29 U.S.C. §
161 (1976) (National Labor"Relations Board); 49 U.S.C. §§ 11701-10 (Supp. III 1979) (Interstate
Commerce Commission).
150 E.g., ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847, 854-56 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981); NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carrier, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 111-13 (3d Cir. 1979). Gould is the
only case which correctly analyzed LaSalle and the criminal purpose defense. The court recognized that LaSalle was dealing with the criminal purpose defense in the tax context. A statutory
analysis was necessary to determine whether it was an abuse of power for the Interstate
Commerce Commission to issue a summons solely for a criminal purpose. The court concluded
that "the congressional approach to the regulation of commerce [was] similarly structured." 629
F.2d at 855.
" Whether this limitation pertains to other agencies depends on their statutory scheme,
although in the majority of cases, the limitation will be applicable. See note 55 supra.
l See note 56 supra.
's One of the major reasons why enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was
delegated to the SEC was its independence from the executive branch of government. See [1977]
400 Sc. Pac. & L. REP. (BNA) A-2 (Apr. 27, 1977) (statement by Congressman Eckhardt
(D-Tex)).
160LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 312.
"I1See Comment, supra note 99, at 786-87.
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prove unfair to the defendant. The evidence might lead the prosecution to evidence which it would otherwise not have obtained under
normal criminal discovery.
Clearly, the best solution is for the court to refuse enforcement of
the subpoena after indictment. Protection of the defendant's rights
demands that nothing less be done. Such a solution is not unduly
burdensome to the SEC since, prior to indictment, it has ample time
to subpoena any documents or witnesses necessary for the civil case.
Furthermore, once the grand jury is convened, the SEC is on notice
that its subpoena power may soon be terminated. Finally, this solution is not substantially harmful to the public because the SEC will
have progressed sufficiently in the civil investigation to be able to
warn the public of any market abuses.
Philip L. Guarino

